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This paper examines the role of institutional quality in the external debt–economic 
growth relationship. By taking a dynamic threshold specification to a panel data 
consisting of 53 countries, we find that external debt has an adverse effect on a country’s 
growth, while institutional quality improves it. We find that the effect of external debt 
on economic growth depends on the level of institutional quality. In addition, at a 
high level of external debt, the effect of institutional quality on growth is very small, 
suggesting that the adverse effect of external debt on a country’s economic growth 
holds true.
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I. INTRODUCTION
External debt is an important initiative for capital formation in the Solow growth 
model, which explained why countries borrow from abroad (Villaneuva, 2003; 
Otani and Villanueva, 1989). The early work of Griffin and Enos (1970) highlighted 
that external debt may enhance economic growth only to a certain point. Global 
debt (both public and private) has reached an all-time high, while emerging market 
public debt is at levels last seen during the 1980s debt crisis and low-income 
countries are experiencing a sharp increase in their debt burden (IMF, 2019). This 
high debt burden potentially represents a risk to economies having implications 
for financial stability and crowding out investment. 
However, to-date, there is a lack of consensus in the literature on the effect of 
external debt on a country’s economic growth. There is a considerable literature 
supporting a negative effect of external debt on a country’s economic growth 
(Cordella et al., 2010; Pattillo et al., 2011; Ramzan and Ahmad, 2014; Daud and 
Podivinsky, 2012; Pattillo et al., 2004; Chowdhury, 2001; Sen et al., 2007).1 In 
contrast, Pattillo et al. (2002, 2004), Cordella et al. (2010), and Imbs and Ranciere 
(2005) find that the effect of external debt on growth is positive up to a certain limit 
of external debt. 
Thus, no clear consensus exists on the relationship between external debt and 
economic growth. Despite this lack of consensus, managing debt is critical, since 
it also involves risks and costs, and paying-off debt simultaneously. Seminal work 
on the sources of growth, including the Solow model, and the endogenous growth 
model and its extensions, assume that distributive policies and institutional quality 
are in place for income to converge (Law et al., 2018; Daud and Podivinsky, 2014; 
Law et al., 2013). Relevant institutions playing their role in the regulatory framework 
could lower the probability of a debt overhang (Imbs and Ranciere, 2005). The 
challenges one might highlight in debt initiatives are the quality of the political 
environment, government legislation, institutional framework, and delivery of 
basic services (IMF, 2013).2 In addition, Pattillo et al. (2004) explained that the main 
channel through which debt affects economic growth is the quality and efficiency 
of investment rather than its level. Meanwhile, the quantity and productivity of 
inputs, be they capital or labor, will be influenced by the institutional environment 
(Gwartney et al., 2004). One might wonder whether or not the environment and 
the institutions, including economic freedom, complement the impact of debt on 
economic growth.3 This could be translated to the potentially important factors 
explaining the adverse effect of debt on growth, which could be summed up as 
the quality of policy and institutions. On the other hand, the institutional quality 
1 The adverse effect of external debt on growth may be related to debt overhang and the crowding-out 
effects, whereby external debts are excessively high and associated with a low ability. A high debt 
levels are likely to discourage of foreign investment.
2 One important lesson learned from the recent global financial crisis 2007–2008 is that prudent 
macroeconomic policies should be supported by a political environment and relevant government 
legislation conducive to boosting the domestic economy (UNECA, 2012). In addition, Alfaro et al. 
(2004) point out the importance of local conditions (such as expropriation risk) in facilitating the 
effect of capital flows to a country.
3 There are studies showing a positive relationship between economic freedom and growth (see, e.g., 
Gwartney et al., 2004; Dawson, 2003; Heckelman and Stroup, 2000; Heckelman, 2000).
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of a country has a significant and positive effect on the level of long-term debt on 
a firm’s financial structure, thus suggesting that it is an important determinant of 
corporate financing and debt maturity (Kirch et al., 2012). 
Research in this area has started to investigate the role played by institutional 
quality on the effect of external debt on growth (Mensah et al., 2018; Cordella et 
al., 2010; Imbs and Ranciere, 2005). Focusing on highly indebted countries over 
the period from 1970 to 2002, Cordella et al., (2010) find that countries with good 
policies and institutions still experience negative effects of external debt (a strong 
debt overhang position), if countries held debt in excess of 25% of gross domestic 
product (GDP). In a country with bad policies, the debt threshold is lower, but the 
evidence of debt overhang is weaker (Cordella et al., 2010). Thus, no conclusion 
can be made regarding the external debt–economic growth nexus using this study. 
Meanwhile, Imbs and Ranciere (2005) find that a debt overhang is less likely to 
occur with more effective governance and within a better legal and contractual 
environment. However, a debt overhang might still happen at a higher level of 
indebtedness. A recent study by Mensah et al. (2018), in the context of 36 Sub-
Saharan African countries, supports the existing evidence that the impact of 
external debt on growth is through countries’ institutional quality, but only up 
to a point. In other words, when a country is on the wrong side of the debt Laffer 
curve, external debt and institutional quality becomes irrelevant (Mensah et al., 
2018). However, the paper does not suggest the cut-off of debt on the debt Laffer 
curve. 
Table 1 provides a summary of previous literature on the role of institutional 
quality in the debt–growth relationship. Hypothetically, good institutional quality 
would act as an accelerator to growth. In addition, the quality of institutions may 
impact the effect of debt on growth through the efficient allocation and responsible 
use of debt. As such, this paper extends prior studies by covering a large group 
of countries comprised of a longer sample period. We use a robust estimation 
method that sheds lights on the role of institutional quality in the effect of external 
debt on a country’s growth and the optimal level of external debt a country should 
hold. Although several studies investigate the effect of foreign investment flow 
on growth, little attention is paid to the effect of external debt and institutional 
quality on growth. We make small but important contributions to the external 
debt–growth literature by investigating the effect of external debt on growth 
conditional on institutional quality. The recent rise in global uncertainty and 
the associated disruptions in economic activity, following the novel coronavirus 
outbreak, highlight the importance of understanding the sources of growth in 
order to better optimize growth policies.4 Countries completely locked down to 
minimize the spread of the coronavirus (see Iyke, 2020a; Phan and Narayan, 2020), 
which would worsen their ability to service their debts and potentially harm their 
ability to borrow in the future to invest in growth-oriented projects. In this regard, 
understanding the impact of external debt on growth is important. In addition, we 
4 A growing number of studies show the novel coronavirus outbreak made markets very volatile 
and disrupted global economic activity in various ways (see, e.g., Devpura and Narayan, 2020; Fu 
and Shen, 2020; Haroon and Rizvi, 2020; Iyke, 2020a,b; Mishra et al., 2020; Narayan, 2020; Phan and 
Narayan, 2020; Prabheesh et al., 2020; Salisu and Adediran, 2020; Salisu and and Akanni, 2020; Vidya 
and Prabheesh, 2020). 
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extend the literature by employing the dynamic panel threshold regression method 
of Kremer et al. (2013) to explore the non-linear relationship between external debt 
and economic growth, and we estimate the threshold values of external debt and 
institutional quality on economic growth. 
Table 1.
 Summary of the Studies Between External Debt, Institutional Quality, and 
Economic Growth
This table present the current literature that investigate the relationship between external debt, institutional quality 
and economic growth.
Authors Sample countries














The quality of institutions matters 
to the external debt-growth 
relationship depending on the level 
of external debt. Countries with 
good policies and institutions face 
overhang when NPV of external 
debt rises above 20–25 percent of 
GDP, while in countries with bad 
policies and institutions, overhang 
and irrelevance thresholds seem to 
be substantially lower (10–15 and 














Institutions matter in the external 
debt-growth relationship. 
Government effectiveness, the rule 
of law and bureaucratic quality 
correlate positively with economic 
growth and tend to limit external 
debt build-up.
In addition, external debt overhang 
occurs when the face value of 
external debt reaches 55 to 60 
percent of GDP or 200 percent of 
exports, or when the present value 
of external debt reaches 35 to 40 
percent of GDP or 140 percent of 
exports. However, external debt 
overhang may still happen in 
economies endowed with good 
institutions, but for higher values of 
external debt.











The results from the system-GMM 
found that institutional quality 
has robust effects on the external 
debt–growth nexus. However, the 
mediating effect of institutional 
quality on this nexus is up to an 
optimal level of the external debt-
Laffer curve. 
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Based on a panel data consisting of 53 countries over the period of 2005-2016, 
we show that external debt has an adverse effect on a country’s growth, while 
institutional quality improves it. We show that the coefficient of the interaction 
between external debt and institutional quality is statistically significant with 
a negative sign, implying that the effect of external debt on economic growth 
depends on the level of institutional quality. In addition, at a high level of external 
debt, the effect of institutional quality on growth is very small, suggesting that the 
adverse effect of external debt on a country’s economic growth holds true. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the data and 
methodology. Section III presents the empirical results, while Section IV concludes 
the paper.
II. MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This paper follows the standard growth literature to investigate the external debt–
growth relationship by specifying the empirical model as:
(1)
where  is economic growth measured as the growth rate in GDP per 
capita, EDit is country i’s external debt level, Xit is a vector of control variables 
used in the growth literature, namely initial income, investment-gross domestic 
product ratio, population growth rates, trade, and institutional quality (see 
Cordella et al., 2010; Iyke, 2017, 2018; Takumah and Iyke, 2017; Juhro et al., 2020; 
Ho and Iyke, 2020), eit is the error term, i = 1,...N is the country identifier, and 
t = 1,...T is the time identifier. The institutional quality indicator is measured 
using the country external debt policy, economic management cluster, and 
macroeconomic management indicators published by the World Bank, which 
are developed to assess the quality of a country’s present policy and institutional 
framework. For each criterion, countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 6, such that 
a 1-rating implies a very weak performance and a 6-rating implies a very strong 
performance. The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) consists of 
16 criteria, which are grouped into four clusters. This paper focuses on one of the 
CPIA clusters, namely economic management. The economic management cluster 
includes macroeconomic management, fiscal policy, and debt policy. The debt 
policy management assesses whether the external debt management strategy is 
conducive to minimizing budgetary risks and ensuring long-term external debt 
sustainability. Macroeconomic management assesses the monetary, exchange 
rate, and aggregate demand policy frameworks. We choose this cluster because 
the quality of economic management would possibly affect the role played by 
external debt on a country’s growth, since external debt consists of a government’s 
external debt. In addition, economic management plays a role in facilitating the 
business eco-system, thus enhancing the efficiency or productivity of external debt. 
Investment ratio and population growth represent physical and human capital 
accumulation, respectively.5 The model used to estimate the impact of institutional 
quality on the external debt–growth relationship is as follows:
5 A list of countries is presented in Appendix 1.
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where mi, qt, and eit represent the country-specific effect, time effect, and the 
white-noise error term. The coefficient associated with β3 captures the effect 
of institutions on the external debt–growth relationship. In other words, the 
interaction variable, EDit * IQit, captures the idea that institutional factors may 
explain the variation in the external debt–growth nexus.6
We employed the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) to estimate Eq. (2). A general dynamic panel 
model for country i at time t is:
where ji is the vector of country effect, Xit is an N x p matrix of p explanatory 
variables, and eit is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. A 
common approach to estimating a dynamic panel data model in the first difference 
GMM estimator, which was proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and can be 
formulated as:
The idea of this estimator is to take the first differences of the variables in order 
to eliminate the source of inconsistency (i.e. the country-specific effect ij ,), and use 
the levels of the explanatory variables lagged at least two periods as instruments 
(see Arellano and Bond, 1991). For the first difference GMM estimators to be 
consistent, we must assume that the errors are not second-order serially correlated 
and that explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. However, Blundell and 
Bond (1998) pointed out that when explanatory variables are persistent, the 
lagged levels of the explanatory variables are weak instruments for the variables 
in differences. They showed that, in a small sample, the shortcomings of weak 
instruments translate into a large finite sample bias. By adding (3) into the original 
equation (4), a level of a system of equations that also include variables in the first 
differences, the system GMM estimator is particularly useful in controlling for 
country-specific effects. Additionally, the system GMM estimator preserves the 
cross-country dimension of the data that is lost when only the first differenced 
equation is estimated (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
In the system GMM estimator, the equations in the first differences eliminate 
the fixed effects in the model. Moreover, the difference equations are combined 
with equations in levels, which are instrumented with the lagged first differences 
of the corresponding explanatory variable. In other words, the system GMM 
estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables by 
using the instrumental variables. In order to use these additional instruments, 
we need the identifying assumption that the first difference of the explanatory 
variables is not correlated with the explanatory variables; the correlation is 
supposed to be constant over time. If the moment conditions are valid, Blundell 
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and Bond (1998) showed, in Monte Carlo simulations, that the system GMM 
estimator performs better than the first difference GMM estimator. We can test 
the validity of the moment conditions by using the conventional test of over-
identifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958), testing the null hypothesis to 
verify that the error term is not second-order serially correlated. The system GMM 
estimator has several advantages when estimating the growth model. By taking 
the first difference approach to remove the unobserved time-invariant, country-
specific effects, the system GMM estimator eliminates omitted variable bias that 
are constant over time (Bond et al., 2001). In addition, the use of instrumental 
variables allows the parameters to be consistently estimated, which eliminates the 
potential endogeneity problem as well as measurement errors.
We carried out robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of our results to 
additional estimation strategies and methods. We employed the dynamic panel 
threshold regression method by Kremer et al. (2013) to explore the non-linear 
relationship between external debt and economic growth. In addition, we used 
this method to estimate the threshold values of external debt and institutional. 
Kremer et al. (2013) extended Hansen’s (1999) static panel threshold estimation 
and Caner and Hansen’s (2004) cross-sectional instrumental variable (IV) threshold 
model, using a GMM-type estimator to control for endogeneity. The threshold 
regression model is as follows:
(5)
(6)
where ED is the threshold variable and l is the unknown threshold parameter. 
In the following model IQ is the threshold variable:
I() is the indicator function, which takes the value 1 if the argument in 
parenthesis is valid and 0 otherwise. This allows the role of external debt on a 
country’s economic growth to differ depending on whether ED or IQ is below or 
above some unknown level of l. The impact of external debt on growth is captured 
by b1 and b2 for low and high regimes, respectively. This method allows for a 
difference in regime intercept (d1).
We estimate Eq. (6) using the least squares estimator for a fixed threshold l, 
where the endogenous variables are replaced by the predicted values in the reduced 
form regression. We then choose the threshold value l based on the smallest sum 
of squared residuals. After estimating the threshold value , we estimate the slope 
coefficient using the GMM estimator. The critical values for determining the 95 
percent confidence interval of the threshold value are given by:
where C(a) is the 95 percentiles of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood 
ratio statistics LR(l) Data are collected from various sources, including the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
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(CPIA) databases hosted by the World Bank. The sample consists of 53 countries 
and covers the period from 2005 to 2016.7
III. RESULTS
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the variables over the period of 2005 to 
2016. The information derived from the descriptive statistics provides an overview 
of a country’s position in the sample. The average growth rate of GDP per capita 
shows is 3.04% with a standard deviation of 3.46%. Meanwhile, the average external 
debt per Gross National Income (GNI) is approximately 43.37. The averages 
of the three institutional quality in indicators (external debt policy, economic 
management cluster, and macroeconomics management) are, respectively, 3.62, 
3.65, and 3.81. Since institutional quality is measured such that 1 and 6 imply low 
and high institutional quality, respectively, this means, on average, institutional 
quality is moderatein these countries.
7 Data on governance indicators are only available for the year 2005 onwards. Due to short sample 




This table present descriptive statistics (namely, mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (min.) and maximum 
(max.) values) for the 2005-2016 period. The variables noted in column 1 are growth rate of GDP per capita, initial 
income, investment, population, trade, external debt and institutional indicators (namely, external debt policy, 
economic management and economic management cluster). In addition, the measurement and source of the data are 
displayed in the last two columns.
Variables 
(abbreviation) Mean SD Min. Max. Measurement
Source of 
data
Growth Rate of GDP per 
Capita (GROWTH)
3.04 3.64 -22.23 18.00 Annual percentage 
growth rate gross 
domestic product per 





Initial Income 1484.67 1313.78 218.28 8221.77 Lagged of gross domestic 
product per capita 





Investment 24.64 8.67 5.46 68.02 Gross capital formation 









Trade 78.87 32.15 19.10 203.83 As percentage of GDP WDI, 
World 
Bank
External Debt (ED) 43.37 29.38 1.98 231.99 As percentage of GNI WDI, 
World 
Bank
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Over the period 2005 to 2016 on average, countries held more than 50% of their 
external debt in the form of public external debt, thus highlighting the importance of 
analyzing the role of institutional quality in the external debt–growth relationship. 
That is, at high levels of external debt holding, does institutional quality matter? 
Figure 1 shows a scatter diagram of external debt versus GDP per capita growth 
for the 53 countries using data averages from 2005 to 2016. Countries that hold 
over 60% (of GNI) as external debt, such as the Republic of Congo and Gambia, 
experience less than 2% in GDP per capita growth. Meanwhile, Bhutan, Georgia, 
Lao PDR, and Mongolia are among those countries that hold an external debt of 
more than 60% of GNI and are associated with a high GDP per capita growth (i.e. 
they experienced, at least, 6% of growth). Thus, having a higher debt is associated 
with higher growth for most countries in our sample. This could highlight possible 
benefits for the countries holding external debt. 
The results on the effects of external debt and institutional on a country’s 
growth are shown in Table 3. Our analysis starts by examining the impact of 
external debt on growth, as shown in column 2 (Model 1a). The results reveal that 
external debt has a negative impact on growth, which is consistent with previous 
studies (Cordella et al., 2010; Pattillo et al., 2011; Ramzan and Ahmad, 2014; Daud 
and Podivinsky, 2012; Choong et al., 2010; Pattillo et al., 2004; Chowdhury, 2001; 
Sen et al., 2007). Considering the other three models (i.e. Models b, c, and d), the 
slope coefficient on external debt is statistically significant and is in the 0.07 to 0.08 
range, suggesting a decline in growth of at least 0.07% for a percentage change in 
external debt. The control variables show the correct signs and are significant at 
the 5% significance level, at least. In addition, the main model could not reject the 
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation at the 5% significance level, 
at least. Besides that, the p-value of 0.90 generated by the Sargan test suggests 
that we could not reject the null hypothesis of no over-identifying restriction for 
the estimation. This shows that the instrument variables in our system GMM 
estimations are valid. 
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics, 2005-2016 (Continued)
Variables 
(abbreviation) Mean SD Min. Max. Measurement
Source of 
data
Institutional Quality Indicator (IQ)
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Table 3.
 Results on GMM-System Estimation on External Debt, Institutional Quality and 
Economic Growth
This table shows the relationship between external debt, institutional quality and economic growth. The baseline 
results on the effect of external on country economic growth is present in column 2 (model 1a). In addition, model 1b, 
1c and 1d present the results of debt-growth model with the inclusion of institutional quality variable namely external 
debt policy, economic management cluster and macroeconomic management respectively. Notes: ***, ** and * denote 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Statistics in parenthesis denote the t-statistics.
Figure 1. 
External Debt Versus GDP per Capita Growth 
The figure plots a scatter diagram of external debt versus GDP per capita growth for 53 countries using data averages 
































































GROWTH Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d













Initial income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(18.74) (15.75) (15.80) (16.94)
Investment 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(11.75) (13.59) (8.52) (9.12)
Population growth 0.84*** 1.67*** 1.75*** 1.09***
(6.76) (9.62) (7.92) (7.55)
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Table 3.
 Results on GMM-System Estimation on External Debt, Institutional Quality and 
Economic Growth (Continued)
A negative effect of external debt on growth, as reported in recent and previous 
studies leads to the possible existence of a contingency effect of external debt on 
economic growth. Before analyzing the contingency effect of institutions on the 
effect of external debt on economic growth, we analyze the effect of institutions on 
growth and report the results in columns 2 to 4 of Table 3 (i.e., we estimate Models 
1b, c, and d, respectively). The three institutional quality variables have a positive 
and statistically significant impact on economic growth, meaning that institutions 
positively contribute to economic growth, which is consistent with several studies 
(see, e.g., Mensah et al., 2018; Cordella et al., 2010; Presbitero, 2008; Imbs and 
Ranciere, 2005). However, with the inclusion of the institutional indicator in the 
external debt–growth nexus specification, external debt consistently contributed 
negatively and significantly to growth, at least, at the 5% significance level (i.e. 
Models 1b, c, and d), based on the p-values, we could not reject the null of no 
second-order serial correlation for the AR(2) test for these models. The Sargan 
test also could not reject the null hypothesis of no over-identifying restriction, 
suggesting that the instruments are valid. 
We further extended our analysis to consider the contingency effect of 
institutional quality on the external debt–growth nexus. Intuitively, since external 
debt also involved equal representation of private and government borrowing, 
institutional quality matters in ensuring the efficient allocation and distributions 
of debt to targeted sectors and specifically formulated policies. We follow Mensah 
et al.’s (2018) approach and report our results in Table 4. The results show that 
the interaction terms between external debt and the institutional quality variables 
are significant at the 5% significance level, implying that the effect of external 
debt on economic growth depends on the level of institutional quality. However, 
GROWTH Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d













Trade 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(18.22) (9.48) (8.17) (11.73)
ED -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08***
(21.24) (20.26) (22.02) (18.49)
IQ 2.05*** 2.05*** 0.61***
(6.59) (9.80) (4.66)
Constant -5.57*** -13.86*** -14.65*** -8.02***
(11.18) (11.76) (13.28) 10.70)
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.56
Sargan test (p-value) 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.91
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the negative sign of the interaction terms would lead to the argument regarding 
why external debt affects a country’s economic growth negatively as institutional 
quality improved. 
Table 4.
 Results on GMM-System Estimation on External Debt, Institutional Quality and 
Economic Growth (Interaction Between Institutional Indicator and External Debt 
Variable)
This table present results of the interaction between institutional quality variable and external debt variable. Notes: 
***, ** and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. Statistics in parenthesis denote the t-statistics.











Initial Income 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(19.99) (22.38) (9.61)
Investment 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(10.95) (12.12) (13.29)
Population Growth 1.58** 1.74*** 1.14***
(6.54) (6.03) (4.69)
Trade 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06***
(9.79) (10.95) (8.25)
ED 0.01 0.06*** 0.08***
(1.26) (4.26) (6.28)
IQ 3.00 3.71*** 2.46***
(12.64) (10.73) (14.31
ED*IQ -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(8.27) (9.80) (10.80)
Constant -17.25*** -20.59*** -15.59
(15.70) (12.28) (14.80)
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.53 0.54 0.59
Sargan test (p-value) 0.95 0.95 0.94
The other explanatory variables show a consistent effect on economic growth 
at the 5% significance level. The p-values for the serial correlation test suggest that 
we could not reject the null of no second-order serial correlation. The Sargan test 
also fails to reject the null hypothesis of no over-identifying restriction, suggesting 
that the instruments are valid. 
To further investigate the negative effect of the interaction term (i.e. interaction 
between external debt and institutional quality), we explore possible threshold 
levels of external debt and institutional quality using a dynamic panel threshold 
regression. Table 5 shows the results using the three institutional indicators. In 
Model 3a, where the external debt is a threshold variable, the threshold level of 
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external debt as a percentage of GNI is 46.56% with a 95% confidence interval 
of [29.28, 54.45]. External debt has an insignificant effect on growth below the 
threshold value (see Panel B of Table 5). However, the effect of external debt 
on economic growth becomes negative after this threshold value is surpassed. 
By carefully looking at our data, we observed that external debt surpassed the 
threshold of 46.56% in 214 out of the 636 periods (t). Armenia, Burundi, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Comoros, Congo, Democrat Republic, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Congo 
Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Guyana, Georgia, Ghana, Gambia, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Lao, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, St. Lucia, 
Togo, Uganda, and Vanuatu experienced, at least, one period where external debt 
holding surpassed the threshold level. Meanwhile, for Models 3b, 3c, and 3d, where 
the institutional quality indicator is the threshold variable, the threshold value lies 
within 3 to 4.5 index points. Since institutional quality is defined such that 1 and 6 
denote, respectively, low and high institutional quality, the threshold values imply 
that below 3 and above 4.5 denote, respectively, low and high institutional quality. 
The impact of external debt on growth is negative but insignificant when 
institutional quality threshold is below 3.00, while the effect becomes significant 
above this threshold(see Models 3b and 3d, and Model 3c), thus suggesting that 
the negative effect of external debt on economic growth is non-monotonic, since it 
depends on the level of institutional quality. In other words, as institutional quality 
improves, the negative effect of external debt on growth becomes important, 
consistent with Cordella et al. (2010), who found that countries with good policies 
and institutions still experience the negative effect of external debt as the debt level 
rises above 25% of GDP. Unlike Cordella et al. (2010), we find that the negative 
effect of external debt sets in when external debt exceed 45.56% of GNI.
Table 5.
 Results of Dynamic Panel Threshold Estimation with External Debt and 
Institutional Quality Indicators as A Threshold Variable
This table shows the robustness test of the external debt and institutional quality on economic growth by employing 
the dynamic panel threshold estimates. Notes: ***, ** and * denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Statistics in 
parenthesis denote the t-statistics.
Panel A: Threshold variable Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d















Threshold estimates, 46.56 4.50 3.00 4.50
95% confidence interval [29.28,54.45] [4.50,4.50] [3.00,3.33] [3.00,4.50]
Panel B: Impact of external debt on growth
0.02 -0.02** -0.00 -0.02**
(0.61) (2.29) (0.36) (4.34)
-0.01** -0.18** -0.03** -0.42
(3.05) (4.37) (3.21) (1.53)
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Panel A: Threshold variable Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d















Panel C: Impact of covariates
Initial income it-1 -6.38** -4.71** -4.67** -5.55**
(4.59) (3.54) (3.22) (4.32)
Investment it 0.08** 0.07** 0.07* 0.08**
(2.09) (1.97) (1.72) (2.11)
Population growth it 0.50 0.91 0.24 0.39
(0.69) (1.49) (0.33) (0.68)
Trade it 0.02 0.03** 0.02* 0.02**
(1.39) (2.07) (1.71) (1.85)
0.91 -8.86** -3.16** -15.27*
(0.66) (2.08) (2.92) (1.67)
Table 5.
 Results of Dynamic Panel Threshold Estimation with External Debt and 
Institutional Quality Indicators as A Threshold Variable (Continued)
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the effect of institutional quality and external debt on 
economic growth, while controlling for the traditional determinants of growth. 
An important way our work is different from the literature is that we estimate 
and model the threshold level of debt required for an economy to optimize the 
effect of debt on growth. We add to this analysis a search for the threshold level of 
institutional quality. We examine the way external debt and institutions interact, 
and test how these parameters influence the impact of external debt on growth. 
Our hypothesis is that, while external debt and institutional quality negatively and 
positively affect growth, respectively, their interaction should have a moderating 
effect on growth. In addition, as institutional quality improves, the effect of debt 
on growth should be positive. We find that, as institutional quality improves, the 
negative effect of debt on economic growth holds true. Specifically, we estimate 
that the negative impact of external debt on growth is relevant as external debt 
exceeds 46.56% of GNI. A fortiori, the accumulated external debt level needs to 
be reduced to a prudent level where good institutional quality could positively 
complement the effect of external debt on a country’s growth. 
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APPENDIx
Appendix 1.
List of 53 countries
List of the countries are presented in this table. We have 53 countries.
Afghanistan Armenia Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Bangladesh
Bhutan Bolivia Chad Comoros Congo, Dem Cabo Verde
Cambodia Cameroon Congo, Rep. Cote d’Ivoire Guyana Georgia
Ghana Honduras Gambia Haiti India Kenya
Kosovo Kyrgyz Lao PDR Lesotho Madagascar Malawi
Mali Mozambique Mauritania Moldova Mongolia Nicaragua
Nigeria Nepal Niger Pakistan Rwanda Senegal
Sierra Leone Sri Lanka Sudan Tajikistan St Lucia Tanzania
Togo Uganda Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vietnam
